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Abstract—The emerging blockchain technology has enabled
various decentralised applications in a trustless environment
without relying on a trusted intermediary. It is expected as a
promising solution to tackle sophisticated challenges on personal
data management, thanks to its advanced features such as im-
mutability, decentralisation and transparency. Although certain
approaches have been proposed to address technical difficulties
in personal data management; most of them only provided pre-
liminary methodological exploration. Alarmingly, when utilising
Blockchain for developing a personal data management system,
fictions have occurred in existing approaches and been promul-
gated in the literature. Such fictions are theoretically doable;
however, by thoroughly breaking down consensus protocols and
transaction validation processes, we clarify that such existing
approaches are either impractical or highly inefficient due to
the natural limitations of the blockchain and Smart Contracts
technologies. This encourages us to propose a feasible solution in
which such fictions are reduced by designing a novel system
architecture with a blockchain-based “proof of permission”
protocol. We demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of the
proposed models by implementing a clinical data sharing service
built on top of a public blockchain platform. We believe that
our research resolves existing ambiguity and take a step further
on providing a practically feasible solution for decentralised
personal data management.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Data Management, Decentraliza-
tion, Ethereum, Smart Contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been a blooming volume of
personal data from heterogeneous sources from social network
to medical devices. The massive aggregation of personal data
collected by centralised service providers (SPs) has raised
critical privacy threats to billion clients (i.e., Data Owners
(DOs)), particularly with the lack of mechanisms for effec-
tively controlling and auditing personal data usage [1]. The
new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 has taken
a step further toward dealing with personal data abuses. As
the GDPR legislation only provides data projection princi-
ples, solutions must be implemented as its complimentary,
considering state-of-the-art technological resolutions. In this
regard, the emerging Blockchain (BC) and Smart Contract
(SC) technologies, which play as the backbone of a variety
of decentralised applications and services, are expected to
1https://gdpr-info.eu
be a prospective solution. Thanks to the features such as
decentralisation, immutability, trace-ability, and transparency;
a BC-based personal data management system could (i) bring
full control back to data owners; (ii) provide secure and
efficient access control mechanisms for data usage; (iii) cater
auditability and provenance tracking of data access; and (iv)
decentralise the system by removing trusted intermediaries and
prevent the single-point-of-compromise and -failure.
A number of research articles have stated technical po-
tentials of blockchains in managing personal data [2]–[6];
however, most of them only provided preliminary method-
ological exploration or conceptual models without analysing
and implementing a BC-based personal data management
system in details. Such systems adopt an undeniable holistic
architecture of decoupling the BC, which is for accounting and
auditing data access, from a storage layer, which physically
stores data. Unfortunately, there are some flaws in existing
BC-based personal data management systems which have been
disseminated in the literature when actualising the architecture.
Such fictions are consequences of a system design that let
a BC network fully handle data access requests which di-
rectly interacts with an off-chain storage. This design includes
mechanisms which are theoretically achievable. However, by
thoroughly inspecting consensus protocols and transaction
validation processes, we figure out that those mechanisms are
either technologically unfeasible or critically inefficient due to
nature limitations of the BC and SC technologies.
As a motivation, we envisage a decentralised BC-based
personal data management system in which such fictions are
eliminate by re-designing the existing system architecture. In
the proposed system, a BC is only dedicated to authenticate
and authorise permission of requests; data storage and retrieval
are performed directly between a requester and a provider.
For this purpose, we introduce a novel authentication and
authorisation mechanism for personal data query leveraging
the concept of decentralised “access token”, inspired by the
centralised delegated authorisation approach introduced in
OAuth2 standardisation. The feasibility and efficiency of the
proposed models are then demonstrated by an Ethereum-based
clinical trials management system.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
2https://oauth.net/2978-1-7281-2522-0/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE
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briefly presents relevant knowledge and related work. Section
III clarifies fictions with analysis on the existing approaches.
Section IV describes our proposed solution. Section V is
dedicated to the solution demonstration. Section VI concludes
our work with future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Blockchain Technology
BC technology comprises of diversified techniques includ-
ing distributed computing, computer network, database, cryp-
tography, privacy and security. The goal of BC technology is to
create and maintain a distributed appended-only database con-
stituted from a chain of blocks (so-called BC) in which each
block contains a list of transactions organised in Merkle tree,
and is linked with the previous block by cryptographic block
hash. A BC plays a role of a distributed ledger maintained by
peers in a trustless peer-to-peer network in a decentralised
manner for a variety of business logic. Literally, a BC is
resistant to data modification as altering information in a block
requires to negate all hashes in the previous blocks which is
replicated in all nodes in the network, breaking the consensus
among them. This implies an attacker has to take control over
50% nodes in the network, which is supposed to be impossible
[7]. BC’s features including tamper-resistance, transparency
and traceability make it applicable to auditing and accounting
digital assets, particularly cryptocurrencies [8].
A consensus protocol, as a core of BC technology, ensures
all peers in a trustless environment agree on which transactions
are legitimate to be added to a BC; thus, synchronises the
network to maintain a consistent and unique BC among peers
[9], [10]. Proof of Work (PoW) is the most popular consensus
protocol currently used in Bitcoin and Ethereum in which
dedicated nodes (i.e., miners) race to produce hashcash as
an entitlement to add a new block to the chain for some
incentives [11]. The computation-intensive for solving the
hashcash puzzle appears as a critical bottleneck of PoW;
therefore, alternatives have been proposed to mitigate this
deficiency including Proof of Stake (PoS) [12], Proof of Au-
thority, and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) variants [13]. Still,
these consensus protocols impose severe drawbacks resulting
in limited usage compared to the PoW [10].
B. Smart Contracts
A SC is a self-executing program implementing business
logic of a decentralised service using BC. As being deployed
into a BC network, it is a decentralised automation that
verifies and facilitates transactions for enforcing terms and
conditions in the business logic written in form of computer
code in the SC (as clauses in a contract, hence the name)
[14]. Once a party submits transaction to invoke a SC, contract
clauses written in the SC is automatically enforced without the
need for a central enforcement authority. Any BC framework
provides facility for SCs from a simple stack-based scripting
system (e.g., in Bitcoin) to a Turing-complete programming
language (e.g., Solidity in Ethereum). Ethereum is the most
well-known platform offering programmable capability with
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) on which code of arbitrary
algorithmic complexity is compiled and executed [15].
C. Personal Data Management: Scenarios and Challenges
Generally, a DO grants a set of permissions for collecting
and processing data once using a service provided by an SP.
When the DO starts using a service provided by a Third-
party (TP), the TP asks for permission to access DO’s data
that is collected and managed by the SP. A majority of
traditional personal data management and sharing mechanisms
are implemented under a centralised client-server architecture
leveraging a delegated authentication and authorisation server
(Fig. 1), following the OAuth23 access delegation standard.
This approach allows DOs to share their personal data man-
aged by an SP in a simplified fashion with a single log-on.
Fig. 1: Personal data management and sharing in conventional client-server architecture
leveraging a delegated authentication server
As illustrated in Fig. 1, to grant permission for the TP,
the DO logs on the SP’s service and accepts access request
from the TP (step 3). The Authentication server authorises
the permission by providing access tokens (step 4). The TP
then accesses desired data from a Resource Server (RS) with
the tokens as proof of permission (step 5). However, the cen-
tralisation of this approach demonstrates limited transparency
and a lack of trust, which consequently poses variety of
critical concerns [16]. This is because personal data is under
full control of an SP - the only authority to (i) authenticate
and authorise participants; and (ii) manage data access and
provenance. In this respect, personal data management would
be a well-suited scenario for BC technology to shine [2].
D. Related Work
Significant efforts have been carried out that leverage BC for
storing crucial information with decentralised automation (i.e.,
SCs) for asset auditing, access and permission control while
eliminating the reliance on an intermediary. For instance, BC
is used for provenance tracking in logistic and supply chain
in [17] in which business operations are integrated and logged
in immutable distributed ledgers so that product data can be
tracked and traced in a decentralised manner. In [18] cloud
3https://oauth.net/2/
data provenance comprising of full history of operations upon
a data object in a cloud server is recorded in a BC; thus,
preventing from unauthorised access/modification to the prove-
nance data. BC is also used for brokering services in which
a SC is deployed playing as an automated negotiator between
clients and an SP [19]. Blockstack project [20], [21] replaced
traditional centralised domain name system (DSN) with a
decentralised one. Its novel system architecture decoupled a
BC (which stores only domain registration and hash of off-
chain data) from an off-chain cloud data storage (which stores
data payload and owners’ digital signatures). This separation
of on-chain operational management and off-chain data storage
shed the light on other studies that utilise BC for general-
purpose distributed data storage. For example, two data man-
agement platforms for the Internet of Things (IoT) have been
proposed in [3], [4]. Data generated from IoT devices is
stored in a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) whereas pointers
to the data (i.e., data hash) are recorded on-chain. DHT
nodes physically store data and listen to transactions confirmed
by BC to store/send data from/to IoT devices accordingly.
BigchainDB [22] targets a general-purpose distributed storage
system that replaces the P2P communication in a traditional
distributed database by Tendermint [23], a BFT consensus
protocol for networking and consensus. Nodes in BigchainDB
store data in their local MongoDB databases while operations
upon the local databases (e.g., replicas, replication factors)
are controlled by a federation of nodes in a permissioned BC
fashion using Tendermint.
Regarding personal data management, authors in [2] pro-
posed a privacy-preserving platform for data storage and
sharing in which actual data is stored off-chain while data
usage agreement, access control policy and data pointers are
on-chain. Public-key cryptography is also exploited defining
the role of a DO and an SP in a dataset for identity verification
and authentication in a data query request. The BC platform
then authorises data query requests by looking for necessary
information (e.g., access control policy and permission grant)
published in BC. This work has been adopted for numerous
scenarios including IoT data [3], [4] and medical records [5],
[6], [24]. Similarly, a personal files management platform
deployed on top of the Ethereum framework is proposed in
which attributed-based encryption (ABE) policy is recorded
on-chain for providing fine-grained access control [25]. Actual
files are stored using Interplanetary File System (IPFS), a
distributed file storage system [26]. In these works, a BC plays
as an intermediary between DOs and SPs and an off-chain data
storage carrying out missions of authenticating, authorising
access queries as well as storing and delivering data. Further
analysis of this approach will be provided in the next section.
III. FICTION ANALYSIS ON EXISTING BC-BASED
PERSONAL DATA MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS
A. Current Solution Approaches
Existing approaches on BC-based personal data manage-
ment adopted a system architecture constructed from a BC
and an off-chain data storage, as shown in Fig. 2. Accounting
information such as permission grant and data usage policy,
which requires to be immutable and traceable, was recorded
on-chain. Actual data, instead, was stored off-chain. The
separation is a must as it is impractical to store personal data
on a BC; instead off-chain storage offers significantly higher
efficiency and better scalability [20]–[22]. Only references to
the actual data (e.g., hash pointers) were recorded in a ledger.
Fig. 2: System architecture of the existing BC-based personal data management
The general idea of existing solutions is that a BC acts as
an automated access control manager ensuring DOs have full
capability to control their personal data. Hence, the BC handles
two types of requests: Data Query Transactions (DQ-Tran)
for data upload and retrieval, and Access Control Transaction
(AC-Tran) for managing data usage policy. Handling of AC-
Tran is straightforward: a party proposes a transaction com-
prising of an ID, a digital signature and a data usage policy for
a dataset (e.g., grant a consent, revoke a consent, and update
permissions) to the BC. The BC verifies the signature to see (i)
whether the requester has a right to impose the usage policy
(e.g., the requester is the owner or service provider of the
dataset); and (ii) if it is the case, the BC accomplishes the
AC-Tran by appending the usage policy to a corresponding
ledger. Regarding a DQ-Tran, the current solutions implement
a generic four-step procedure as illustrated in Fig. 2:
(i) Transaction Proposal: A party proposes a DQ-Tran to
a BC comprises of a digital signature and an operation
parameter (e.g., READ or WRITE). If the operation is
WRITE, a data payload is then provided along.
(ii) Authentication & Authorisation: The BC verifies the
signature and authorises whether the party has permission
to conduct the requested operation. The authorisation can
be done by inspecting a corresponding access control
policy recorded in a distributed ledger.
(iii) Data Store/Retrieval: Once the party get authorised, the
BC looks up the ledger for the data pointer of the
requested dataset. The BC then uses this data pointer to
upload or retrieve the dataset which is physically stored
in a off-chain Resource Server (RS).
(iv) Data Query Response: The BC finally returns the data
obtained from step (3) to the requester if the requested
operation is READ. If the operation is WRITE, the BC
may return an ACK message, depending on each system.
B. Fiction Analysis
The generic procedure for DQ-Tran imposes some fictions
clarified in details as follows:
1) Overhead Fiction: The overhead fiction comes from a
system design that let a BC network fully handle data query
requests without fully examining the underlying operations of
the BC framework, particularly the consensus protocol, the
transaction validation and ledger update processes. In general,
a transaction life-cycle follows the 4-step procedure:
(i) Transaction Proposal: The client app proposes a trans-
action to invoke a SC for querying personal data, along
with the party’s digital signature for authentication.
(ii) Broadcast and Queuing: The transaction proposal is
broadcast to the BC network and queued at the transaction
pool (i.e., MEMPOOL) in each miner.
(iii) Block Mining: Miners selects the proposal to include
in a block (with other transaction proposals), it is val-
idated and executed. Output of the execution with the
transaction proposal are combined together forming a
transaction which is then put into a pending block.
The miners start mining the block. A miner who wins
consensus race (e.g., solves a hashcash in PoW) seals the
block using block hash and broadcast it to the network.
(iv) Block Validation and Confirmation: Eventually all full-
nodes in the BC network receive the new block after a
certain bound ∆. Upon receiving the block, all transac-
tions in the new block are validated. If each transaction
is valid, each full-node locally executes the transaction
with its local BC state S (line 5 in Alg. 1) and compares
the local result (i.e., a new BC state S′) with the result
sealed in the new block (line 6). If the results are the
same for all transactions; the node synchronises the local
BC with block B.
Alg. 1: BlockV alidation validates all transactions in the block
and only updates the local BC if the results are the same.
Input : new block B; BC state S
Output: true/false
1 for each (transaction T in block B) do
2 if (Validate(S, T ) == false) then
3 halt;
4 Return false;
5 S′ ← Execute(S, T ) . Obtain new BC state
6 if (Merkle root(S′) 6= Merkle root(B(T ))) then
7 halt;
8 Return false;
9 Replace S ← S′
10 Return true;
Let take a DQ-Tran created by a party whose permission
is already granted for instance. As depicted in the life-cycle,
the DQ-Tran is executed by some miners in step (3) and
by all full-nodes in the BC network in step (4). Consider a
weakly synchronous BC network consists of N full-nodes with
propagation delay is bounded on ∆ seconds. Assume that in a
traditional centralised approach, a RS handles k requests per
second (RPS) on average. As each full-node locally queries
off-chain data for transaction validation; as a consequence,
the RS in a BC-based system has to handle at least:
k × N
∆
RPS on average (1)
To illustrate the consequence of the overhead, let us consider
the Ethereum main-net consisting of more than 25000 nodes
with the propagation delay is less than 10 seconds4. Therefore,
if a personal data management system deploys on top of the
Ethereum platform, a RS has to approximately handle more
than 2500 times of the current throughput on average. If the
system is deployed on top of the Bitcoin network, there are
around 9500 reachable nodes5 with the propagation delay is
measured at around 9 seconds [11]; thus a RS has to handle
about 1050 times higher than the current capacity. This is
obviously unacceptable.
Moreover, this system design imposes threats on Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack as it extremely amplifies the
number of requests to the RS in a short duration of time.
Furthermore, a number of the requests have to queue at the
RS’ buffer; thus there is high probability that some requests
are dropped due to limited-size queue. This results in lowering
down system efficiency, even not reaching consensus, as well
as increasing the risk of buffer overflow attacks.
2) The Oracle Problem Fiction: The transaction validation
expects any full-node produces same results when locally
executing a SC; otherwise no consensus can be achieved. This
implies the SC is deterministically executed. Generally, SCs
acquire information from ledgers - consensuses maintained
by all nodes in the network. There might be a problem if
a SC requires information from outside world, which might
impose room for ambiguity. This also turns the whole BC
into a centralised system as it relies on a reliable source of
information. For instance, Ethereum does not provide API
calls capability or built-in probabilistic functions except block
hash and timestamp. Hyperledger Fabric offers more flexibility
as its chaincodes can be implemented in multiple high-level
programming languages with no restriction on determinism.
However, making API calls to outside world always comes
with high caution to ensure designated peer nodes retrieve
exactly same responses. The need for acquiring external in-
formation to execute a SC poses a severe technical barrier to
the BC technology, which is known under the term: “Oracle
problem” [27].
The current approaches on personal data management obvi-
ously impose the Oracle problem. This is because BC nodes
are required to access off-chain data for checking data integrity
in order to prevent a malicious miner from returning false
data to a requester. For instance, hash of the requested data is
recorded on-chain. Once receiving a new block from a miner,
each full-node executes a corresponding SC to query the data
4https://ethstats.net
5https://bitnodes.earn.com
from a RS then compares the hash of the obtained data with
the hash provided in the new block for validating data integrity.
Indeed, there are solutions for the Oracle problem by introduc-
ing decentralised trusted providers who feed required data into
SCs. These data providers are called Oracles. For example,
Oraclize6 deals with the issue by (i) obtaining data from an
external source and delivering the data to the corresponding
SCs (ii) providing an authenticity proof ensuring data integrity.
Currently, there is no solution tackling the Oracle problem
on personal data management. Moreover, with the existing
solution approaches, such Oracles have to handle bursts of
request overheads from all nodes in a BC network, resulting
in dramatically deteriorating system performance.
3) Data Encryption and Fine-grained Access Control Fic-
tions: As not all nodes in a BC are trustworthy, personal data
must be encrypted before carrying out a DQ-Tran. This is
because a DQ-Tran requires any full-node to either obtain
data payload (in WRITE operation) or retrieve data (in
READ operation). Therefore, a shared encryption key must
be established among parties in advance. Certainly, if an SP
requires a distributed off-chain storage platform (e.g., IPFS
[26]), data encryption is a must as storage nodes might be
malicious and insecure. However, if an SP uses a secure trusted
DBMS (e.g., Oracle and MongoDB) or a cloud storage service
(e.g., S3, AWS and Azure), the system design appears to
be expensive and inadequate. The current approaches inflict
consequences on system performance, functionality and access
control due to the following reasons:
(i) Expensive encryption scheme: Data encryption and
decryption always come at high cost; particularly with
large volumes of data or with data streams.
(ii) Content-query not supported: As data is in encrypted
form, data query is limited to only obtain data at a whole;
content-queries are not supported. Thus, these solutions
are applicable to data storage only.
(iii) Coarse-grained Access Control: The encrypted form
of personal data severely limits sharing capability at
a fine-grained level and imposes a painful revocation
scheme [28]. Homomorphic Encryption can be used for
computation (e.g., query data) on cipher-text but it is
extremely expensive [29]. Flexible encryption schemes
like attribute-based encryption (ABE) [28] might also be
a remedy; however, they rely on a trusted key generator,
which require to be customised for a BC-based system.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we propose a novel solution to eliminate
the aforementioned fictions. We consider scenarios that an
off-chain storage RS follows the “honest-but-curious” security
model whereas SPs and TPs might be malicious. This means
the RS honestly performs all required protocols although it
might be curious about the results. A legacy DBMS or a cloud
storage service satisfies this assumption.
6https://docs.oraclize.it/
A. System Design and Procedures
The key idea of the proposed solution is to let a BC play
only two roles: (i) a delegated authentication & authorisation
server; and (ii) an immutable logging system. Other personal
data management business logic such as Data Storage and
Retrieval remain the same as in traditional client-server ap-
proaches (Fig. 3). For this purpose, the BC issues an access
token as “proof of permission” showing that a party has
been granted to access the designated data. The party then
provides the access token as a parameter in API calls to access
data stored in a RS, similar with conventional client-server
approaches. As a result, the Overhead and the Oracle Problem
fictions are eliminated. Furthermore, this system design does
not let any nodes in the BC network access personal data,
along with the assumption of an honest and secure RS, the
Data Encryption fiction is also removed.
Fig. 3: System architecture and procedures of the proposed solution
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the overall system procedure is as
follows: Once a DO uses a service provided by a TP (step-1)
and the TP requires to access DO’s data stored in a RS, the
DO grants consent to the TP by carrying out a AC-Tran to a
BC (step-2). The BC authenticates and executes the AC-Tran,
updating the access control policy recorded in a distributed
ledger to reflect the new consent. Until this step, the proposed
solution is completely the same with the existing approaches.
The difference is from step-3 onward when a party requests
to query data by performing a DQ-Tran. In our solution, the
BC neither directly retrieves off-chain data nor returns data
back to the requester; instead it provides an access token
as “proof of permission” (step-3) and let the party directly
query data from a RS using the provided access token (step-4).
The RS validates the data query request (including the access
token) with the BC (step-5) before returning the requested
data in case the request is valid. The honest RS assumption
is utmost important to ensure that the RS genuinely executes
the validation on whether an access token is valid and used by
a corresponding authorised party. The system design requires
no changes in the SP’s and RS’s business logic. The only
requirement is the involvement as clients of the BC system to
perform required SCs’ functions.
B. Distributed Ledgers Data Structure
Distributed ledgers recorded onto BC contain necessary
information for personal data management business logic. This
information must be specified as it is the main content of the
ledgers and the core of any BC-based applications. For easy
illustration, Ethereum is used as the reference BC framework,
thus, the distributed ledgers comprise of time-stamp sequenced
records of all state transitions. A state is in form of are in form
of key-value pairs, and a state transition records all changes
to the key-value pairs as a result of a transaction. For the pro-
posed personal data management, two ledgers are constructed
namely access ledger and token ledger containing informa-
tion for access control and access token management. Data
models for access ledger and token ledger are described in
Listing 1 and Listing 2, respectively.
1 "access_ledger": {
2 "key": {
3 "DO_ID": "address",
4 "SP_ID": "address",
5 "TP_ID": "address"
6 },
7 "value" {
8 "data_pointer": "string",
9 "data_hash": "bytes32",
10 "access_token": "bytes32",
11 "permission": "uint8"
12 }}
Listing 1: access ledger data model in JSON format
1 "token_ledger": {
2 "key": {
3 "access_token": "bytes32"
4 },
5 "value" {
6 "DO_ID": "address",
7 "SP_ID": "address",
8 "TP_ID": "address",
9 "issued_at": "uint256",
10 "status": "bool",
11 "permissions": "uint8",
12 "expires_in": "uint",
13 "refresh_count": "uint"
14 }}
Listing 2: token ledger data model in JSON format.
The access ledger is for authorisation and access con-
trol mechanisms contains information about DO, SP and TP
identities (as “key” in key-value pair), and data pointer,
data hash, and permission as a simple data usage policy
specifying CRUD operations (as “value” in key-value pair).
The token ledger is dedicated for managing access token
with information about DO, SP and TP identities and asso-
ciated meta-data. The access ledger is connected with the
token ledger by referring the access token in its value for
additional access control and audit tasks.
C. Smart Contract Functionality
Variety of functions should be implemented in a SC for
accounting access control and data query activities. Many
functions in the proposed system are similar with ones in
existing approaches, particularly the functions for performing
AC-Trans such as Registration, Permission Grant, Permission
Revocation, and Permission Check. Additional functions are
implemented as a result of the introduction of the “proof
of permission” recorded by the token ledger. As a reward,
there are no more functions implementing DQ-Trans tasks
(e.g., upload and retrieve data to/from an off-chain storage
system). Fig. 4 depicts the data query sequence diagram in
which step 3-10 demonstrates the differences of the propose
solution compared to the existing solutions. As illustrated in
Fig. 4, if a query request is accepted (step 2), a new record
of token ledger as “proof of permission” is generated (or
updated in case it is already existed) (step 3) before returning
to the TP (step 4). The creation of the record is straightforward
as it generates deterministic meta-data except the access token
value (i.e., the key in the key-value pair “token ledger”).
The access token should be (pseudo)random and unique, and
a trick is used to generate an unique pseudo-random token in
Ethereum as follows:
access token = hash(Parties IDs + Block.Hash) (2)
Alg. 2 depicts the V alidation function invoked when a
party call an API to the RS providing an access token, an
operation op, party’s identity (i.e., address) pk and a digital
signature t as parameters (step 5-8 in Fig. 4). The algorithm
firstly validates the identity of the API requester using an
signature verifying function V (line 2). If the request is from
DO or SP then there is no further check for the access token;
only meta-data for the token in token ledger is updated (line
5-8). Otherwise, the validation is conducted by inspecting the
meta-data (line 9-12) before updating the token ledger (line
12, 13). This function ensures that only API calls with valid
access token are executed (step 9-10 in Fig. 4).
Fig. 4: Data Query sequence diagram
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We consider a use-case a clinic (i.e., SP) collects clinical
trials from patients (i.e., DOs) and stores in a secure and honest
RS. This data is then shared with TPs for research. The BC-
based clinical data management system is built on top of the
Alg. 2: V alidation invoked by a RS for validating a data query
request and updating the token ledger accordingly
Input : string token, address pk, signature t, operation op
Output: out
1 Initialisation: rec ← null, out ← rejected
2 s← V(pk, t) . V: Signature verifying function
3 if s then
4 rec ← token ledger[token]
5 if ((rec.DO ID = pk) ∨ (rec.SP ID = pk)) then
6 token ledger[token].expires in -= Time.now();
7 token ledger[token].refresh count += 1;
8 out ← accepted
9 else
10 if (rec.TP ID = pk) ∧ (rec.permission ⊂ op) ∧
11 (rec.expires in > 0) ∧ (rec.status = true) ∧
12 (rec.refresh count < threshold) then
13 token ledger[token].expires in -= Time.now();
14 token ledger[token].refresh count += 1;
15 out ← accepted
16 Return out
Ethereum framework. The source-code is GPL licensed and
can be found at our Github7.
A. Resource Server Setup
We build a RESTful web-service as a RS allowing parties
to query clinical trials by calling RESTful APIs. Clinical
trials are stored in JSON-like documents using MongoDB8,
a document-oriented database. The trial information includes
patientID, name, contact information and data object. Data
query includes {create, read, update, delete} (i.e., CRUD
operations) on clinical trials. An API call to the RS is
an HTTP method comprising of Method (e.g., GET
and POST ), REST.Endpoint (e.g., localhost:8080),
API.Endpoint (e.g, /ClinicalDataManagement),
Header (e.g., Content.Type:application/json) following
by Params including identity pk, signature t, access token,
and a CRUD operation op, along with payload in the body.
The RESTful web-service is required to be an client of
the Ethereum private network for the API call validation.
An additional Javascript program leveraging the Web3JS li-
brary9 is integrated with the RESTful APIs for interacting
with the Ethereum network. The Javascript program proposes
transactions invoking the V alidation function with necessary
parameters provided in an API call.
B. Smart Contracts Implementation
The SC is implemented in Solidity deployed in an Ethereum
test-net using Truffle suite framework with Ganache tool10.
In the demonstration, Ethereum address is used for party
identity. This means patients and research institutes are clients
of the Ethereum test-net and are assigned with a corresponding
address as ID associated with a private-key. Ledgers in form
of value-key pairs are defined as global variables using the
built-in mapping type in which “key” is a primitive types and
7https://github.com/nguyentb/Personal-data-management
8https://www.mongodb.com/
9https://github.com/ethereum/web3.js
10https://truffleframework.com
“value” is a user-defined struct. For example, token ledger is
defined according to the data format in Listing 2 as follows:
mapping (string => Token) public token_ledger
where “key” in token ledger is a string generated by Eq. 2
and “value” is an instance of the user-defined Token struct.
As Solidity only allows primitive types as “key” in
mapping and the “key” in the access ledger data for-
mat defined in Listing 1 contains three IDs, we separate
the access ledger data model into three separated differ-
ent ledgers namely ACL ledger, ACL keeper ledger, and
Data ledger. The three ledgers are connected by referring
parties’ ID (i.e., Ethereum address) to each other. In the
demonstration, data usage policy is in form of Access Control
List defined by a nested mapping between DO address, TP
addresses, and an instance of ACL struct as shown in the
below code . The ACL struct consists of a combination of the
CRUD operations and an associated accesstoken. Based on
these clarifications, required functions including V alidation
are successfully carried out.
mapping (address => mapping (address => ACL)) ..
public ACL_ledger
C. System Performance Evaluation
Our aim in the demonstration is to show the feasibility of
the proposed model instead of optimising system performance.
We carry out a benchmark for our private Ethereum network
utilising the BLOCKBENCH tool [30]. In the evaluation, a
network consisting of varied number of full-nodes from 4 to
32 is setup, in which 8 concurrent clients intensively incur
workload to the Ethereum system in every 5-minute period.
Fig. 5 interprets the results on the performance and scalability
of our system. As shown in the figure, the Ethereum-based
system only reaches maximum 375 transactions per second
(tps) with 4 full-nodes running PoW at about 46 seconds
latency implying that the system only serves limited number
of simultaneous requests. Severely, when scaling up, the
performance is considerably deteriorated in terms of both
throughput and latency. For instance, with the setup of 32
full-nodes, the Ethereum-based platform can only serves 70
tps with the delay at around 165 seconds. The results show
that the system is only suitable for small-scale services. As
the system performance heavily depends on the underlying BC
network instead of an application built on top, getting better
performance requires more research on Ethereum protocols
such as consensus, sharding and micro-payment, which are
out of score of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we point out three crucial flaws in the
existing BC-based personal data management systems due to
the inadequacy and inefficiency of the design architecture that
let a BC network fully handle data access from/to an off-
chain storage. We then propose a novel solution to deal with
these flaws by re-designing the system model that utilises
a novel concept called decentralised “proof of permission”
represented in form of access token. An access token is issued
and delivered to a party by a BC network if it meets data usage
policy recorded in a ledger. The party then use the access token
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Fig. 5: Performance vs Scalability with 8 clients intensively incurring high workload
to query data as long as the query request passes the validation
from a RS with the BC. The feasibility of the solution is
successfully demonstrated by the clinical trials management
use-case. We believe this research removes existing ambiguity
and plays a catalyst to develop a practical BC-based personal
data management.
As a future work, performance evaluation will be conducted
comparing different system designs with different BC plat-
forms. Herein, a distributed off-chain storage in which some
storage nodes may misbehave should be taken into account.
More efforts are needed to resolve the lack of a trusted storage
system for a fully decentralised system. An automated fine-
grain expressive usage control in which a SC implementing
an smart policy generator in a context-aware fashion is a
promising research direction. Last but not least, as data queries
only relate to storage mindset (CRUD operations only), BC
can be exploited for computational capability, meaning BC
nodes, as secure multi-party computation agents, carry out data
processing and return requested results instead of raw data.
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